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Abstract—Protecting the confidentiality, integrity and 
availability of information is very important in any 
telecommunications system. Information protection requires use of 
necessary physical, personal, information and communication 
technologies and above all – electromagnetic and cryptographic 
security measures. Equipment and tools for cryptographic 
protection should be examined and assessed in terms of resistance 
to known threats. Additional requirements are put on information 
protection for radio communication, especially military, where 
radio transmission is characterized by uncertainty of establishing 
and maintaining connections, bit rates are relatively low, often 
without full duplex. All this has an impact on the methods of 
cryptographic synchronization and implementation of 
cryptographic functions. A different approach to information 
protection is required by classic narrowband radio 
communications, a different one in time-division multi-access 
modes, and another one in broadband packet data transmission. 
Systems designed for information protection in radio 
communications implement appropriate operating modes of 
operation for cryptographic algorithms and protocols. Latest 
threats from quantum computers pose new challenges, especially 
in systems using public-key cryptography, because there are 
algorithms that can be used to attack these schemes with 
polynomial complexity. 
 
Keywords—cryptography, cryptanalysis, radio communication, 
quantum computers 
I. INTRODUCTION 
NFORMATION affecting security should be processed under 
conditions that prevent the loss of confidentiality or integrity 
and ensure only authorized access to it. This is especially 
important in radio telecommunication systems where the risks 
of loss information confidentiality are extremely high. 
Cryptographic modules for narrowband and broadband radios 
have been developed for years. These projects take into account 
specific requirements of radio transmission in poor propagation 
conditions and with intentional interferences, which results in 
varying connectivity and low data throughputs in 
communication channels. The need to build advanced networks 
and implement a number of services are further challenges for 
radio communication and its security. 
The latest threats from cryptanalysis methods using quantum 
computers have an impact on cryptographic algorithms and 
protocols. In the case of symmetric cryptography (with secret 
keys) there is a need to extend the keys, encrypted blocks, 
integrity and authentication tags. While, for asymmetric 
cryptography (with public keys) additional security mechanisms 
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should be used at present, and in the near future new algorithms 
and protocols resistant to cryptanalysis performed on quantum 
computers should be developed and implemented. 
II. INFORMATION PROTECTION 
A. General Requirements 
Required level of security is defined depending on the 
classification of protected information and identified threats in 
the exploitation environment. There are no reduced 
requirements for systems operated in battlefield conditions also 
for systems using radio communications. 
When building a cryptographic system for the protection of 
information, especially classified, one must take into account 
potential threats, specify security features, perform the design 
and implementation, conduct security tests, and then ensure the 
proper implementation for use. It is a costly process that is 
subject to the risk of change. Radio communication places 
additional requirements because of varying connectivity, no full 
duplex connections, channels with low data capacity, potentially 
long delays and optional work in radio silence. 
Today, the risks of cryptanalysis using quantum computers 
should be taken into account. Additional security mechanisms 
should be implemented for currently used public-key 
cryptography. Symmetric cryptography algorithms should have 
extended keys and other parameters. All this affects 
communication and cryptographic protocols. 
B. Cryptography and Cryptanalysis 
Cryptography and cryptanalysis are complementary parts of 
cryptology. Cryptography deals with methods to ensure the 
confidentiality, integrity and availability of information, while 
cryptanalysis deals with attacks that allow an adversary to break 
these protections. 
Algorithms and protocols are an important element of any 
cryptographic system. Cryptographic algorithms are 
constructed and used to provide services such as confidentiality, 
integrity, authentication and non-repudiation. Cryptographic 
protocols are used, among others, for authentication and key 
agreeing. All cryptographic algorithms and protocols need 
cryptographic data for operating, i.e. keys, passwords, random 
data, identification data. The security provided by these 
algorithms and protocols depends largely on keeping keys 
secret. The security of the algorithms themselves is based on 
their design and the lack of effective methods of cryptanalysis. 
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The selection of appropriate algorithms and protocols and 
their operating modes depends not only on the classification of 
protected information, but also on the specificity of a given 
system – including threats and transmission possibilities. 
Special cryptography modes and dedicated security profiles are 
often specified for radio communication. The latest threats from 
quantum computers also affect the selection of cryptography. 
C. Symmetric and Asymmetric Key Material 
In symmetric cryptography the communicating parties use the 
identical copies of the key material, also known as pre-placed 
key. Symmetric key has two major disadvantages, both 
associated with key management. First, if any key in the 
communications network is compromised, all communications 
on that network are compromised, including past transmissions 
using the same net key which may have been recorded. The 
secret of the key must be kept until the end of its validity period. 
If the key secret is lost, all communicating parties must 
exchange the key. The second disadvantage concerns the 
requirement of direct key distribution. Symmetric key material 
must be distributing to all sites before use in a secure manner. 
In cryptography using an asymmetric key material each side 
has a public and a private key component. Asymmetric key 
negotiation provides a secure communication with unique key 
material valid only for that session. The first step is for the two 
sides of the communication to exchange authentication 
certificates to prove to the other side that they are both valid 
users. After authentication, each side performs an algebraic 
operation to their public component, and transmits that 
information in the clear to the other side. Upon receipt, this 
public information is combined with private component to 
derive a unique symmetric session key. The strength of this 
system lies in the unique session keys as opposed to the common 
shared key in a symmetric pre-placed key system. 
Unfortunately, public-key cryptography requires a trusted third 
party for authentication as well as time and data consuming 
protocols. 
D. Encryption Devices 
Electronic, digital encryption devices have been designed for 
decades for the army and special services, including those used 
to protect information in radio communications. Last years 
brought significant changes in the approach to the protection of 
information. We began to use standards in designing and 
assessing the security of cryptographic systems. Modern sets of 
cryptographic algorithms have been designed to meet security 
requirements. Efficient hardware methods for random numbers 
generation and complete systems for planning, generation and 
distribution of keys have been developed. Security requirements 
have forced a formal approach to tests and evaluations of 
cryptographic devices 
The use of the newest electronic technologies, mechanical and 
electromagnetic security as well as newly designed 
cryptographic algorithms has allowed the construction of 
encryption devices and key management systems to 
successfully pass safety requirements. These include link 
encryptors and also devices for information protection in packet 
networks, generally with the Internet Protocol. Link encryption 
devices are used to protect information in less complex 
telecommunications systems using also legacy radios. IP 
encryptors can be used to protect information in radio networks 
too, if the packet data exchange is available. 
Currently, research, development and implementation works 
are underway for crypto devices dedicated to radio transmission 
– narrowband and broadband also with the IP. These devices 
implement specific protocols for establishing encrypted 
connections and implementing encryption in operating modes 
dedicated to radio and satellite transmission. 
E. Management of Cryptographic Keys  
An important element of any information protection system is 
the cryptographic key management subsystem, which is 
designed to meet the needs of cryptographic devices for keys 
and other materials necessary for their work. Such subsystems 
are traditionally built with several modules responsible for 
preparing a plan of secret connections, generating, 
authenticating and distributing cryptographic keys and also 
monitoring and management of the encrypted communication 
network. 
Recently implemented systems automate many of these 
functions. Key management for the information protection in 
radio networks has its own specifics, hence keys loaded from 
electronic media directly to devices are often used to ensure 
their long-term operation even without radio communication 
with the management center. Also, establishing encrypted 
connections and agreeing session keys are simplified – 
protocols with a small number of runs and resistant to high error 
rates and other connectivity issues are used. 
III. PROTECTION OF INFORMATION IN MILITARY RADIO 
COMMUNICATIONS 
In the tactical environment, communications require 
interoperable and flexible infrastructures to support the rapid 
reaction capabilities of an operational commander. The services 
are required within and between all levels of command. Current 
operational needs require interoperability of various types of 
telecommunications networks. The requirement for secure 
communications adds an additional layer of complexity to this 
already challenging environment. 
Military radio communication is characterized by the 
uncertainty of establishing and maintaining connections. Even 
if radio devices ensure high efficiency and quality of 
connections, in battlefield conditions, in the presence of an 
enemy actively affecting radio space, this statement is highly 
probable. The above has an impact on cryptographic algorithms 
and protocols used to protect information in radio 
communication, their modes of operation and key management 
subsystems. 
A. Narrowband Systems 
Narrowband radio communication systems are most often 
organized to work in HF or VHF radio networks which enable 
the transmission of voice signals or serial data [1]. Some radios 
have implemented more advanced modes of operation, e.g. 
TDMA or ALE. There are also those that support packet data 
transmission (IP), selected services such as e-mail or tracking 
the position of troops [2]. But many of them do not provide 
information protection. Therefore, we constructed crypto 
module as an external device, which can be attached to any type 
of radio, if only it provides a compatible type of communication 
interface. Such a common interface turned out to be a 
synchronous serial interface, which is made available by 
modems of most narrowband HF and VHF radios. 
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The crypto module works synchronously with the clock given 
from the radio – so the type and transmission speed settings are 
made only in the radio, and the module adapts to them. The 
module can be connected with terminal devices via a 
synchronous or asynchronous serial interface. These modules 
work in simplex mode – at the moment one of them encrypts 
data to the transmitting radio and others from the group decrypts 
data from receiving radios. Scheme of work of the stream 
encryptor and decryptor in crypto modules is presented in the 
Fig. 1. Data transmission is controlled by send and receive 
signals (RTS, CTS, etc.), which allows it to be organized in half-
duplex mode. There may be more than one decryptor on the 
receiving side. 
 
Fig. 1. Scheme of work of the stream encryptor and decryptor 
Many tests have shown effective cooperation of the crypto 
modules with many HF and VHF radios in various operating 
conditions and various modes of serial transmission. The use of 
the module did not affect the effectiveness of establishing 
connections and did not degrade the quality of voice and data 
transmission. This was possible thanks to the use of an 
appropriate crypto connection protocol – setting session keys 
and crypto synchronization, resistant to poor transmission 
conditions – high error rate, as well as a cipher mode adapted to 
simplex or half-duplex operation, which does not duplicate any 
transmission errors that may occur (while the radios maintain 
the continuity of transmitting and receiving clocks). It was also 
possible to obtain secret connections between radios of different 
manufacturers when they work in compatible data transmission 
modes. 
The crypto module allows encryption at speeds adapted to the 
mode of operation of the radio, at transmission rates from 50 
bit/s to even several dozen kb/s. This is quite enough for 
narrowband radios. The main limitation introduced by this 
module is the need to separate user signals, which should be kept 
secret, from radio control signals that should reach the radio in 
an uncovered form. An additional disadvantage may be the 
additional delay in data and voice transmission introduced by 
the module. 
Tests of the crypto module performed with the HF radio RKP-
8100 from CTM (Centrum Techniki Morskiej, eng. Maritime 
Technology Center) showed its correct operation during data 
and voice transmission. An interesting solution used during 
these tests was the IZG-2000 integrator, which integrate the 
radio with crypto module and voice and data transmission 
services. Work diagram of the crypto module with the RKP-

















Fig. 2. Work diagram of the integrator with crypto module 
IZG-2000 has a built-in MELP hardware vocoder operating at 
a rate of 600 bit/s. In addition, it has a serial interface for 
asynchronous data transmission. The integrator has a built-in 
priority mechanism for voice transmission. After the tangent is 
pressed the integrator stops sending data with the simultaneous 
permission to send data from the vocoder. After releasing the 
tangent, the integrator allows further transmission of held data 
from the terminal. These functionalities have been verified with 
the crypto module introduced in the transmission line between 
the integrator and the RKP-8100 radio. 
B. Broadband Systems 
Broadband radios allow us to build more advanced 
communications networks in terms of organization and 
management, throughput available to users and support for 
many types of services [3]. And just, as in narrowband radios, 
packet transmission is rather an addition to operating modes, so 
in broadband radios it is a standard. Hence, the approach to 
cryptographic information protection for broadband radios may 
be closer to classic IP networks. But, the specificity and 
limitations of radio systems still need to be taken into account. 
There is no fixed communication infrastructure in a tactical 
environment. Networks are formed by radios that can play a role 
of routers or endpoints, which communicate with each other 
over the air, where the topology of this network changes. Some 
of the nodes may need to be able to operate in radio silence, 
where they must be able to listen in on the network, but not 
expose their position through transmission. So, cryptographic 
protocols for establishing secure connections and also 
encryption modes should take into account these restrictions. 
Currently, broadband radios and standards implemented in 
them are being developed among allies. In the area of military 
radio communication so-called waveforms are developed 
defining a number of functions implemented in the radio that 
transform the user signals into signals emitted by the radio 
antenna. In addition, this type of radio has built-in intelligence 
enabling highly automated establishing and maintaining the 
appropriate quality of connections, organizing extensive 
wireless communication networks (also working in motion) and 
supporting the implementation of various services and 
applications for users. Examples of this type of waveforms are: 
ESSOR HDR (European Secure Software Defined Radio 
Program High Data Rate Waveform) and Coalition Wideband 
Networking Waveform (COALWNW). 
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In the area of information security, cryptographic protocols 
and algorithms with their operating modes and profiles 
specifying their use are standardized within NATO. The Secure 
Communications Interoperability Protocol (SCIP) standard [4] 
based on the American Future Narrowband Digital Terminal 
(FNBDT) project is dedicated to protect information transmitted 
over switched narrowband channels. SCIP operates at the 
application layer and allows establishing a secure voice 
connection or data transmission on a previously established 
duplex channel. SCIP operating on pre-placed keys (PPK) can 
also be used for communication on simplex radio channels and 
for point-to-multipoint communication. The standards for 
secure communication TSVCIS (Tactical Secure Voice 
Cryptographic Interoperability Specification) and STaC-IS 
(Secure Tactical Communications – Interoperability 
Specification) are defined for tactical radio. A version of SCIP 
protocol is also defined over IP, which allows its use in 
broadband radios, but not all required operating modes have 
been covered by this standard so far. That is why NATO NII IP 
Network Encryption (NINE) standard [5] based on the 
American High Assurance Internet Protocol Encryptor (HAIPE) 
is designed to ensure the security of IP packet communications, 
also using radios. NINE uses the set of IPsec protocols to 
provide encryption and authentication of data sent in IP 
networks after prior authentication and key agreement of the 
communicating parties. 
Cryptography in radios is used to ensure transmission security 
(TRANSEC), security of organized networks (NETSEC) and 
security of transmitted user information (COMSEC). 
Broadband radios provide user interfaces, where in the data link 
layer dominates Ethernet and in the network layer – IP 
technology. Therefore, cryptographic solutions designed to 
protect information should be tailored to these technologies. The 
NINE standard is suitable for implementation in broadband 
radios based on IP packet transmission. The radio profile for 
NINE is being defined. Taking into account the specificity of 
radio communication, to the profile are chosen those operating 
modes that charge communication channels as little as possible, 
and minimize the use of a trusted third party for authenticating 
and use pre-placed keys to fast establish secret relationships 
(compared to multi-pass authentication protocols and session 
key agreeing using public key cryptography). 
TABLE I  
SCIP AND NINE COMPARISON 
 SCIP NINE 




Main purpose Voice Data 
Aauxiliary fate Data Voice 
Throughput 50 b/s – several Mb/s tens kb/s – 10 Gb/s 
Types of networks any networks in the 
lower layers 
IP networks 
Develop a session key Symmetric and asymmetric cryptography 
Key distribution 
(NATO) 
Common KMI for SCIP and NINE 
Short comparison of SCIP and NINE protocols is presented in 
the Table I. Key management is another important issue for 
secure connectivity. For SCIP and NINE standards, we can use 
asymmetric cryptography with public key or symmetric 
cryptography with secret keys. Secret keys (PPK, APPK) 
provided before the mission to communicating radios will allow 
faster and more reliable establishment of encrypted connections. 
This is beneficial in radio communication where there are 
deficits in the available bit rates. In addition, point-to-multipoint 
connections can be established only with secret pre-placed keys. 
Again, the use of public-key cryptography makes the encrypted 
connections more flexible, but requires a trusted third party, as 
well as authentication protocols and session key agreement that 
overload communication channels. Hence, the selection of the 
appropriate key management method must be preceded by an 
analysis to match the solution to the capabilities of radio 
networks as well as to the needs of users and security 
requirements. 
IV. KEY MANAGEMENT INFRASTRUCTURE FOR RADIO 
Military radio stations should support cryptographic key 
management models for the two primary types of keying 
material, which are asymmetric and symmetric. As the 
infrastructure to support asymmetric key management for 
Radios matures in NATO, it is expected that this model will 
become a dominant key management approach in the future. 
Currently used systems use model for distribution of 
symmetrical keys. 
A. KMI for Narrowband Systems 
In a typical implementation, a Key Management Infostructure 
(KMI) for the distribution of symmetric keying material consists 
of a hierarchical structure with a central node on top of the 
hierarchy that operates as an oversight authority and key 
processing facility. The central facility supervises acquisition 
and/or generation of keying material as well as initiates a 
unidirectional distribution of keying material down to the client 
nodes, which may in complex environments involve 
intermediate management tiers as well. The client nodes operate 
as interfaces for access to KMI functions, which include the 
requesting of keying material. 
This solution has been implemented and tested for HF and 














Fig. 3. KMI for narrowband radio systems 
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B. KMI for Broadband Systems - PKI 
In the future, all military radio stations should support PKI 
infostructure. In a typical PKI implementation, a Certification 
Authority (CA) plays the most important role – trusted party. A 
CA is a virtual entity that is trusted to create and manage public 
key certificates over their lifetime. A CA is bound to a certificate 
policy, and a certificate practice statement. CAs are supported 
by additional components, including:  
• a repository of PKI information such as PKI certificates and 
Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs), which is typically 
X.500 compliant with a Lightweight Directory Access 
Protocol (LDAP) interface;  
• a suit of servers (typically Web-based) for the purposes of 
enrolment, certificate resigning/renewal, Online Certificate 
Status Protocol (OCSP) interactions, CRL distribution, 
certificate management messaging, CA administration, 
logging, etc.; 
• an ECU Registration Management component, which is an 
optional component utilized for large and/or 
geographically/functionally distributed customer bases to 
























Fig 4. KMI for broadband radio systems 
V. THREATS FROM QUANTUM COMPUTERS 
Symmetric cryptography algorithms are used to ensure data 
confidentiality, integrity and authentication. These algorithms 
are computationally effective, and their security is based on a 
secret, shared cryptographic keys. Such keys must be securely 
delivered to users, which will challenge the subsystem for the 
generation and distribution of cryptographic data. Also, the 
flexibility (e.g. adding a new user) of symmetric key systems 
has some limitations. 
Since the late 70s of the 20th century, we have been observing 
the development of asymmetric cryptography with public-
private key pairs and asymmetric key agreement protocols 
based on public parameters. Cryptography and protocols of this 
type allow to provide flexibility in the operation of 
telecommunication systems. Subsequent system users can join 
secure communication when they authenticate their public keys 
and parameters and keep their private keys secret. Protocols for 
key agreement of symmetric session keys, which are then used 
to protect the confidentiality of transmitted data, base on public-
key cryptography. 
Simultaneously with the development of public-key 
cryptography we are observing the progress in their 
cryptanalysis [6]. The previously known algorithms for solving 
computationally difficult problems, which are behind the 
security of public-key cryptography, have the exponential 
complexity (memory or time) using classical computers to such 
type of the attacks. Unfortunately, using quantum computers, 
there are algorithms [7] that can be used to attack public-key 
schemes with polynomial complexity. For example, the Shor 
algorithm provides exponential acceleration of the factorization 
problem by using the superposition of quantum states. Quantum 
computers also have a negative impact on the security of 
symmetric key cryptographic algorithms [8], because the 
Grover algorithm [9] and Simon's algorithm [10] allow the 
construction of effective, quantum attacks on this type of 
cryptographic transformations. For the practical implementation 
of the algorithms of Shor, Grover, Simon, there is a lack (for 
now) of efficient quantum computers with an industrial scale of 
application. 
A. Security Degradation of Key Agreement Protocols 
The possibility of launching an attack using a quantum 
computer has serious implications for the security of currently 
used cryptographic mechanisms applied during agreement of 
the session key using public-key algorithms. Asymmetric 
algorithms and protocols based on difficult computational 
problems: factorization of integers (e.g. RSA) or discrete 
logarithm (e.g. DH, MQV, DSA, ECDH, ECMQV, ECDSA) 
[11], in the model of attack using a quantum computer, they no 
longer provide security [12]. This is due to the fact that there are 
algorithms that can be performed on a quantum computer, 
which significantly reduce the computational complexity of 
cryptosystems based on these problems. 
Having a quantum computer, that will be able to effectively 
implement the Shor algorithm, it can be stated that 
cryptographic algorithms based on the factorization and discrete 
logarithm problems will lose their significance, regardless of the 
length of used keys. RSA with 2048 or 4096-bit keys, DSA and 
DH based on Elliptic Curves with P-256, 384 or 521 – all these 
algorithms have polynomial security in function of the key 
length on quantum computer. Security degradation is due to the 
fact that the time needed to break these cryptosystems will be 
much less than the time they need to effectively perform their 
cryptographic functions (e.g. confidentiality of the agreed key, 
or digital signature security). 
At present, public-key algorithms and protocols must be 
reinforced with private-key mechanisms. Ultimately, these 
algorithms must be replaced with structures resistant to attacks 
using quantum computers. Intensive work is ongoing in this 
area. 
B. Reduction of the Security of Symmetric Algorithms 
The Grover algorithm is an implementation of searching for 
an element that meets certain conditions in an unordered set with 
2n elements. Classical algorithms require O(2n) operations, 
while the Grover algorithm requires only O(√2n) operations, 
which gives a quadratic gain in performance on quantum 
computer. Let's consider a symmetric block algorithm using n-
bit cryptographic key. Then the classical attack has the 
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complexity of O(2n), while the attack using the Grover 
algorithm on a quantum computer has the complexity of O(2n/2). 
The effectiveness of the attack using the Grover algorithm 
does not depend on the currently used symmetric algorithm that 
ensures confidentiality, but only on the bit length of the 
cryptographic key used. Scientific analyzes indicate that in the 
case of symmetric algorithms ensuring confidentiality (in the 
context of quantum computers) security can be ensured by 
extending the cryptographic keys from currently used range 
128÷256 to 256÷512 bits. Encrypted blocks should also be 
extended. 
C. Security Reduction of Cryptographic Hash Functions 
The family of cryptographic hash functions is also vulnerable 
to a quantum attack using the Grover search algorithm. The 
Grover algorithm can be used to find collisions for 
cryptographic hash functions, with complexity being the square 
root of the complexity resulting from the length of the hash 
generated by the function, as is the case with searching a 
disordered database. In addition, it has been proven that it is 
possible to combine the Grover algorithm with the birthday 
paradox – we will then get a quantum birthday attack method. 
By creating an array of size ∛2n and using the Grover algorithm 
to find collisions, it is possible to construct an effective quantum 
attack. This means that in order to provide n-bit security against 
an attack using the Grover algorithm running on a quantum 
computer, the cryptographic hash function must generate a 3n 
bit hash. Therefore, in order to ensure 128-bit security of the 
integrity of information secured using the hash function, it is 
necessary to use its version designating the 384-bit hash. The 
cryptographic functions SHA-2 and SHA-3, which determine 
the hash of at least 384 bits, remain secure against attacks using 
quantum computers. 
D. Loss of Security of Data Authentication 
Data authentication modes of operation of cryptographic 
algorithms are designed to guarantee the authenticity of the 
message. The standard security model is that it is difficult to 
forge a message with a valid tag, even having access to the 
oracle, which calculates the MAC (Message Authentication 
Code) tag of each selected message. In order to transfer this 
concept of security to a quantum case, it is assumed that the 
opponent receives an oracle that accepts the quantum 
superposition of the message as input and calculates the 
superposition of the corresponding MAC. In the quantum attack 
model, the Simon’s algorithm helps to solve the problem of 
finding n-bit mask for Boolean function defined over the set 
{0,1}n. This problem can be solved classically by looking for a 
collision with the time complexity O(2n/2). Simon's algorithm 
solves this problem with only O(n) quantum complexity. 
The Simon’s algorithm performed on a quantum computer 
allows an attack on the following authentication modes using 
symmetric algorithms as ideal permutations: CBC-MAC, 
PMAC, GMAC, GCM, OCB, causing the loss of authenticity of 
secured data. The computational complexity of the attack is only 
O(n), where n is the length in bits of the data block processed 
by the symmetric algorithm, and it is generally 128. Loss of 
authentication security in an attack model using a quantum 
computer immediately translates into the security problem of 
the set of IPsec protocols ensuring encryption and 
authentication of data sent in IP networks, also using the 
authenticated GCM encryption mode of operation. The success 
of the attack on the authentication mode does not depend on the 
currently used symmetric algorithm. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Building a cryptographic system, we must consider various 
aspects of potential threats, security features, efficiency and 
reliability of implementation. Equipment and systems designed 
for cryptographic protection of information should be examined 
and assessed. Additional specific requirements are put on 
information protection measures for radio communications, 
especially military, where radio transmission is characterized by 
uncertainty of establishing and maintaining connection, bit rates 
are relatively low and most often there is no full duplex. All this 
has an impact on implementation of cryptographic algorithms 
and protocols, which should use simplified operating modes. 
This applies in various ways to narrowband and broadband 
radios. Also, key management systems operating for a 
cryptographic protection of radio communications should not be 
too heavy. 
We are currently facing further challenges related to 
information security, also in radio communications. 
Cryptographic algorithms are at risk from quantum computers. 
Symmetric algorithms ensuring confidentiality should be 
strengthened by extending the cryptographic keys from 256 bits 
up. However, this will affect their performance and probably 
will require an analysis of resistance to other cryptographic 
attacks. It is also possible to use cryptographic hash functions 
which are safe in the classical model, determining a hash of at 
least 384 bits, which remain resistant to attacks using quantum 
computers. Also, other secure modes of operation can be 
selected for data authentication that use symmetric algorithms. 
All this will affect the effectiveness of information protection in 
radio transmission. 
It will probably take several years to build quantum computers 
useful to cryptanalysis. However asymmetric algorithms with 
public keys should be made today resistant to the specific 
properties of quantum computers, for example by using 
symmetric techniques with secret keys. In the near future, 
currently used public-key algorithms must be replaced with new 
ones. The U.S. NIST has initiated a process to evaluate and 
standardize quantum-resistant public-key cryptographic 
algorithms. The second round of the competition is already 
underway. Newly developed asymmetric algorithms, resistant 
to cryptanalysis using quantum computers, first of all should be 
used in protection systems dedicated to classified information 
The above-mentioned recommendations should be 
implemented in the cryptographic modules being developed to 
protect transmitted information in radio communication systems 
to ensure an adequate level of security, not only today, but also 
in the future, when the threat from quantum computers will be 
real. These forces changes to many communication and 
cryptographic protocols, including those implemented as part of 
the SCIP and NINE standards and their radio profiles. 
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